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Abstract
Background: Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are potential instruments to enable private collaboration in the
health sector. Despite theoretical debate, empirical analyses have thus far tended to focus on the contractual or
project dimension, overlooking institutional PPPs, i.e., formal legal entities run by proper corporate-governance
mechanisms and jointly owned by public and private parties for the provision of public-health goods. This work
aims to fill this gap by carrying out a comparative analysis of the reasons for the adoption of institutional PPPs and
the governance and managerial features necessary to establish them as appropriate arrangements for public-health
services provisions.
Methods: A qualitative analysis is carried out on experiences of institutional PPPs within the Italian National Health
Service (Sistema Sanitario Nazionale, SSN). The research question is addressed through a contextual and
comparative embedded case study design, assuming the entire population of PPPs (4) currently in force in one
Italian region as the unit of analysis: (i) a rehabilitation hospital, (ii), an orthopaedic-centre, (iii) a primary care and
ambulatory services facility, and (iv) a health- and social-care facility. Internal validity is guaranteed by the
triangulation of sources in the data collection phase, which included archival and interview data.
Results: Four governance and managerial issues were found to be critical in determining the positive performance
of the case examined: (i) a strategic market orientation to a specialised service area with sufficient potential
demand, (ii) the allocation of public capital assets and the consistent financial involvement of the private partner,
(iii) the adoption of private administrative procedures in a regulated setting while guaranteeing the respect of
public administration principles, and (iv) clear regulation of the workforce to align the contracts with the
organisational culture.
Conclusions: Findings suggests that institutional PPPs enable national health services to reap great benefits when
introduced as a complement to the traditional public-service provisions for a defined set of services and goals.
Background
In the past 20 years, the notion of public service provi-
sion has undergone a radical revision, ultimately
strengthened by a shift towards the view of the state as
a regulator and purchaser rather than purely a provider
of services. Various provision forms have been adopted:
in-house production; outsourcing to other public admin-
istrations; contracting out of peripheral, intermediate, or
final services to private providers; public-private partner-
ships (PPPs) and full privatisation [1,2].
PPPs have long been considered as the form of provi-
sion able to maximise the gains deriving from private
production, while preserving the collective goals of the
public realm. However, these hybrid solutions may be
rather difficult to design and implement, due to the het-
erogeneous - and potentially conflicting - missions,
goals, organisational cultures and legal frameworks
adopted by the partners.
The overarching aim of this paper is to investigate the
motivations for the adoption of institutional PPPs and
the governance and managerial features that could make
them effective. These dimensions are strictly interdepen-
dent and reinforce each other. Indeed, the extent to
which a PPP may support the public administration in
carrying out its functions and in achieving public sector
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goals depends both on the institutional coherence of the
adopted organisational form and the appropriateness of
its governance and managerial structure.
To analyse the mission of institutional PPPs and their
governance and managerial features we carried out a
retrospective and evaluative exam of all of the cases of
institutional PPPs established in the Veneto Region, one
of the most developed areas of Italy in terms both of
socio-economic indicators and quality of public services.
We chose to study cases in the same region, to hold the
characteristics of institutional context (health-care policy
and legal framework) constant, thus highlighting more
clearly the features of the single cases.
Theoretical Framework
PPPs have come to the attention of scholars in a variety
of research fields as potential instruments for channel-
ling collaboration in traditionally public sectors. A num-
ber of scholars in the public management realm have
highlighted the theoretical foundations of PPPs[3]. A
first stream of research has conceived PPPs as a tool for
fostering the privatisation of government functions
through the delegation of public-service provisions,
especially those that are infrastructure-based [2,4-6].
Conversely, sociological approaches to partnership [7,8]
have underlined the importance of PPPs as a new pub-
lic-governance paradigm to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of public service delivery. As such, their
functioning requires not only a well-structured contract
mechanism aimed at reducing transaction costs - as
contended by new institutional economics perspectives
[9-11], but also a degree of mutual trust between the
parties [12].
Despite a surge of interest in the intellectual roots of
PPPs, empirical literature has largely concentrated on
the evaluation of contractual partnerships, with specific
reference to private finance initiatives (PFI), either for
country-specific experience [13-17] or in the context of
comparative accounts [18]. In this perspective, analyses
tend to assess a partnership’s effectiveness primarily in
terms of financial sustainability on the basis of value-
for-money estimates.
However, institutional PPPs - formal legal entities run
by proper corporate governance mechanisms and jointly
owned by public and private parties for the provision of
public goods - have received relatively little attention
from public management researchers. In particular, the
question of the extent to which these forms of stable
partnership can ensure the sustainable provision of pub-
lic services is still under investigated.
Drawing from these premises, the article aims to
examine institutional PPPs with reference to two
research questions: What are the reasons for the adop-
tion of institutional public-private partnerships? What
governance and managerial features are necessary to
make them appropriate arrangements for public service
provisions?
To address these research questions, a multiple
embedded case study analysis of a population of institu-
tional partnerships that emerged in the Italian health
care system (Sistema Sanitario Nazionale, SSN) is pre-
sented. By doing so, this analysis contributes to the con-
struction of a middle-range theory of institutional PPPs
in public tax-funded health systems. Sections 2 and 3
describe the empirical setting and methods, respectively,
and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 provides a
discussion of the findings, and Section 6 draws conclu-
sions from the analysis.
Empirical Setting
The research focused on the Italian National Health Ser-
vice (SSN, Sistema Sanitario Nazionale) in which law-
makers in 1992 provided for the possibility of
introducing institutional partnerships between public
and private parties (DLgs 502/1992) to perform direct
health-care duties - the so-called Joint-Provision-Form
Experiments (Sperimentazioni Gestionali,-JPFE). JPFE
can assume different legal configurations, including
stock companies, limited companies, foundations, and
associations. The unifying factor of this organisational
population is that public and private constituents are
involved in the production of a complex public good,
health care service, albeit with different foci of activity,
e.g., acute or rehabilitative hospital services, outpatient
care, laboratory services. In this way, JPFEs differ from
the other types of public-private partnerships that have
emerged in the public sector, where either the service is
contracted-out to the private sector, or the involvement
of the private sector is limited to the construction of the
facilities and the management of ancillary services (e.g.
private finance initiative).
Public parties must retain majority shareholding
(51%), and specific mechanisms should be introduced to
limit the transfer of private shares to a third party.
JPFEs are originally set up for a defined 3 (+3)-year per-
iod, at the end of which an external evaluation commit-
tee deliberates on either the liquidation or the
confirmation of the settlement. With the exception of a
minor update regarding those JPFEs established as stock
companies (Lgs.D.229/99), the national government has
not provided any additional legislation on the matter.
Further, in the 2001 Constitutional Reform, Italian
regions were given jurisdiction over the authorization,
adoption and monitoring of JPFEs within their jurisdic-
tion. With the exception of Lombardy and Emilia-
Romagna, however, most regions passively acknowl-
edged the 1992 national legislation, thus leading to a
legislative and normative vacuum on the issue. The
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consequences of this lack of political guidance on the
evolution of PPPs is evident when looking at the hetero-
geneity of individual responses to the questions raised
by this study, as reported in the Results section.
Methods
Research Approach
The research questions were addressed through a con-
textual and comparative embedded case study design
[19]. To ensure the external validity of the findings [20],
the research assumed the Italian region as its context,
which shall be studied as an independent health care
organisational field due to recent health reforms that
introduced decentralization principles in the Italian pub-
lic sector field. Saturation was achieved by including, as
the unit of analysis, the entire population of JPFE orga-
nisations established in the regional context. Specifically,
the region under study is Veneto (ca 4.9 mil inhabitants
and an annual public health expenditure of 8.5 billion €)
where the JPFE population currently comprises four
cases: (i) an intensive-rehabilitation hospital (Case A),
(ii) an orthopaedic centre (Case B), (iii) a primary-care
and outpatient facility (Case C), and (iv) a community-
care facility (Case D). Three types of partner were
usually involved in the establishment of a JPFE, namely
(i) local health authorities (LHA), which are large public
health care organisations responsible for the health of
an entire population in a given area (average size of
230,000 inhabitants and an annual budget of 390 mil €
[21]); (ii) private health care providers; and (iii) local
municipalities, which are representatives of the resident
population.
The study is partially grounded in the action research
tradition. One of the authors was member of the regio-
nal evaluation committee in charge of evaluating the
four JPFEs in force within regional boundaries. This pri-
vileged position enabled close interaction with regional
policy-makers and JPFE top managers in the research
process, the use of experiential knowledge as critical
asset in understanding the cases and a close link
between the practice of the research and its impact on
social reality [22].
Data collection
We relied on two primary data sources, archives and
interviews. We began by gathering extensive documen-
tary information from both internal and external sources.
The internal sources included the statutes of the compa-
nies, annual reports, financial and economic prospectuses
including budgets and balance sheets, and board minutes.
The external sources included regional council resolu-
tions, services agreements with the local health authori-
ties, and public tenders for the selection of the private
party. Approximately 23 documents were located per
JPFE, for a total of 95 documents and 1,706 pages. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with managing
directors of the experiments and with board members.
These interviews were complemented by on-site visits to
the facilities. Internal validity is guaranteed by the trian-
gulation of sources in the data-collection phase.
Data analysis
Data analysis began with an in-depth analysis of each
case through the lenses of the research questions [23].
We first compiled and read the cases independently and
then performed a cross-case analysis, in which the
insights from each case were compared with those from
other cases to identify consistent patterns and themes
[24]. Drawing from the literature, institutional partner-
ships were analysed on four dimensions and ten sub-
dimensions on the basis of the focus (internal or exter-
nal to the organisation) and the level (strategic or opera-
tional) of the analysis (Table 1).
Results
Results from the comparative analysis are summarised
in the current section. Each sub-section discusses a
dimension of analysis.
Institutional Aim
A major theme in the pre-establishment phase concern
the motives of both public and private actors in creating
the JPFE. In most cases, the establishment of the colla-
boration followed a public health plan/program reorgani-
sation of the health delivery structure, usually through a
rationalisation of the hospital network and reduction of
extra bed-capacity in the local area. Case A, for example,
used to be an acute care facility that was forced to close
in the 90s when the regional plan gave a nearby hospital
exclusive rights to provide general health services. To
guarantee continuity of care, the decision was made to
convert the old acute care hospital into a high-specialisa-
tion rehabilitative hospital. Similarly, the establishment of
Case B was motivated by the need to preserve the health
care activity of the otherwise redundant hospital existing
in the local area. Case C was based on the reconversion
of the old acute hospital into a social-welfare facility. In
all cases, the involvement of the private partner was
motivated by the public sphere as a way to access addi-
tional financial resources and generate know-how and
economies of experience. Concurrently, from a private
party’s perspective, the new activity would enable optimi-
sation of the company’s cost structure (Case C), or
expand the existing business to either new geographical
locations or activities (Cases A and B).
A common underlying rationale for the choice of a
joint organisational form, as opposed to a traditional
contracting-out agreement concerns the complexity of
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the services delivered. Contractual arrangements tend to
be adopted for services characterised by a greater ability
to be standardised and greater output measurability, e.g.,
laboratory, diagnostic or ancillary services. In contrast,
in the case of a highly complex mix of activities (e.g.,
hospitals, rehabilitation centres) difficulties may arise in
setting up suitable instruments to control qualitative
and quantitative service standards. Furthermore, ques-
tions arise as to whether an effective risk transfer to the
private contracting party can indeed occur, because the
public ultimately keeps the responsibility for (in) effi-
ciencies of the private management and the accountabil-
ity for the production of the service to the population.
Indeed, results show that the JPFE organisational form is
chosen whenever partners aim to work jointly for the
delivery of a complex mix of health services. For example,
Case A is a rehabilitative hospital predominantly focusing
on rehabilitative cardiology and medicine, an outpatient
clinic and diagnostic radiology services. Conversely, Case
B is a mono-specialist centre for rare diseases, including
myelitis and tuberculosis of the bones. Furthermore, it
represents the logistic platform for basic specialised outpa-
tient services and hosts the local emergency department.
Similarly, Case C delivers two major types of health ser-
vice, serving as outpatient clinics for major specialties,
including allergology, angiology, cardiology, surgery, der-
matology, echography, rehabilitative medicine, orthopae-
dics and pneumology, and hosting the local therapeutic
community for mentally disabled patients of the Depart-
ment for Mental Health. Finally, the focus on the welfare
activities also characterises Case D, whose main activities
relate to daily residential services to the elderly and dis-
abled. Specifically, the facility hosts an average of 40 day
hospitals and 200 hospitalised patients, the majority of
whom are not self-sufficient or are affected by degenera-
tive diseases, such as Alzheimer disease.
Governance Structure
Although national legislation does not restrict the speci-
fic type of legal entity, all JPFEs within the region were
set up as stock companies with public-sector majority.
In Case A, ownership evolved from a substantial balance
(52% LHA vs 48% private) to a public-sector dominance
(75% LHA, 1.81% municipality and 23.19% private).
Case B was originally set up as a limited company but
was then transformed into a stock company, with 51%
of shares held by the LHA and 49% by the private party.
Similarly, in Case C the LHA holds 51% of the shares,
the local municipality an additional 1%, and the private
partner the remaining 48%. Contrary to hitherto dis-
cussed experiences, Case D is the only example of a
JPFE with total public-sector ownership. In this case,
67% of the shares are held by the local municipality and
33% by the Local Health Authority. The reason for the
establishment of this partnership was to jointly manage
health and social services for a specific subset of the
population (the elderly) that would otherwise require
the overlapping of competences of the municipality
(welfare) and the local health unit (health).
The analysis of the legal and ownership structure is
strictly related to that of equity and allocation of capital
resources to the newly established company. Of the four
experiences, only Case A has been allocated consider-
able capital resources by the partners, enabling greater
levels of financial autonomy and fostering infrastructural
development. Indeed, the Local Health Authority con-
ferred the building where the previous public hospital
was located (6.2 mil €), whereas the private party con-
ferred financial liquidity for c.ca 2 million €. In contrast,
in the other JPFEs, the public-sector partner retained
the ownership of the buildings, and the society pays a
rent for the use of the facilities. For example, in Case B
the society pays to the local LHA an annual rent of
2.5% of the value of the facilities. In Case C the facilities
are given in commodatum and the society pays a token
of 100 € to the LHA, whereas in Case D the facilities
are owned by the local municipality.
As stock companies, all JPFEs are governed by boards
composed of representatives of both parties, with duties
of long-term strategic planning and budget approval. In
Table 1 Dimensions of Analysis
Focus
External Internal
Strategic (i)
Institutional Aim
• Reason for the creation of the institutional partnership
• Types of activities performed
(ii)
Governance Structure
• Organisation legal entity
• Type of private and public sector partner and relative ownership share
• Level of capital resources conferred to the PPP
• Board governance structure
Operational (iv)
Relationship with the Purchasing Authority
• Type of relation with the Local Health Unit or Municipality
(iii)
Bureaucratic and Administrative Procedures
• Procedures for the selection of the private partner
• Type of legislation adopted for procurement
• Type of contractual arrangement with the workforce
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Case A the board is composed of 9 members, 5 nomi-
nated by the public-sector parties and 4 by the private
parties, while the managing director is nominated by the
LHA out of a tern expressed by the private party. Simi-
larly, in Case C the board is composed of 5 members, 3
of which (including the President) are an expression of
the public sphere, while the Managing Director is nomi-
nated by the private partner. This scheme resembles
Case B’s governance structure. Finally, in Case D the
Board is composed of 3 members, 2 appointed by the
local municipality and 1 by the Local Health Authority.
Bureaucratic and Administrative Procedures
The selection process of the private partner is common
to Case A, B and C. The initiative for the establishment
of the JPFE originated within the public sector realm
and the private partner was selected through public ten-
der with a negotiated procedure. Criteria for admission
included relevant previous experience in the health sec-
tor, volume of activity and workforce. Offers were
assessed on the basis of price and quality criteria of the
partnership project and on the potential accomplish-
ment of specific public-sector goals, such as citizen
orientation in health services (Case C). It might be dis-
cussed whether proper competition has in any instance
really taken place in the selection of the private partner.
Indeed, the analysis showed an average of two or three
offers per tender, and the awarded offers were usually
selected because of a lack of compliance of all others
with one or more admission criteria. As will be dis-
cussed in the next section, this detail might influence
the generalisability and transferability of the JPFE model
to other settings.
The lack of specific regulation on the type of legisla-
tion, administrative or civil, JPFEs should follow in the
performance of daily activities led to a heterogeneity of
solutions adopted to carry out the procurement func-
tion. Indeed, Cases C and D follow the administrative
law of public sector organisations, implying that pur-
chasing activities are carried out by public tender proce-
dures aimed at guaranteeing transparency and
impartiality of the process. In contrast, Cases A and B
follow the civil law of private companies to ensure
higher flexibility and speed in the purchasing process.
The former experience has, however, developed and
implemented a voluntary Code for Purchases that has
been recently proposed as the standard at the regional
level for future JPFEs.
Heterogeneity has also been found in the treatment of
the workforce. In Cases C and D the workforce is
entirely employed by the new public-private company.
In the former case, employees of the former public hos-
pital were transferred to other public facilities within
the same Local Health Unit. Administrative staff are
employed by the company, doctors hold private-practice
contracts, whereas nurses and other non-professional
are employed by a contracted-out cooperative. On the
contrary, in Cases A and B the personnel previously
operating in the former public hospital were given the
option either to work in the new public-private facility
or be transferred to another public hospital. Although a
discrete majority opted for the latter option, part of the
professional workforce decided to remain, thus leading
to the emergence of a heterogeneity of professional fig-
ures within the organisational boundaries. Indeed, public
professionals with a permanent employment contract
maintain the employment relationship with the LHA
and the SSN contract. In contrast, professionals
employed after the establishment of the partnership
hold the national contract for private practice (AIOP).
Should the outcome of the 3(+3)-year partnership prove
positive, public professionals will then be employed by
the company. Otherwise, they will be reintegrated in the
LHA.
Relationship with the Purchasing Authority
The relationship with the purchasing authority plays an
essential role in determining the nature of the activities
performed by the JPFEs. In all cases, a service contract
was agreed upon the company and the public purchaser,
typically the Local Health Authority or the municipality.
The length of the agreement spans from a fixed tem-
poral period (Case A) to the entire duration of the
experiment (Case B). In Case B’s agreement, the local
health authority entrusted the integrated system of
health-welfare services to the company, explicitly prohi-
biting the subcontracting to third parties. In Case A dis-
tinct sub-sets of conventions were signed (e.g., for the
blood centre, and cardiology rehabilitation), and the
total volume of agreed activities agreed sharply
increased, moving from 7 million € in 2004 to 21 mil-
lion € in 2008. Finally, in Case C outpatient services are
fully integrated with those of the Local Health Author-
ity: the planning of the volume of activities of the JPFE
is indeed a sub-set of the budget of the LHA.
Discussion
This section discusses the reported findings and pro-
vides the basis for answering the research questions,
namely the reason for the adoption of institutional PPPs
as complementary provision forms, and the governance
and management features they need to be effective. We
follow the sequence of Table 1.
Institutional Aim
Two possibly conflicting goals led to the establishment
of all the JPFEs. The first is a strategic goal, namely, the
rationalization of the public hospital network and the
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subsequent dismissal of a small general hospital. The
second, however, is the policy goal of maintaining the
local political consensus through the conversion of an
existing hospital into a different type of healthcare facil-
ity that can still be regarded as part of the public realm
and that serves the local population. A major issue in
the establishment phase was therefore the transforma-
tion of the health care generalist orientation and the
definition of a portfolio of highly specialised services. To
implement the new policy and develop the entrepre-
neurial model, the public sector opened up to collabora-
tion with private parties. Indeed, in all cases, private
partners were involved not only in financing the invest-
ments for infrastructural renovation, but also in carrying
out niche activities, because they are supposed to hold
stronger managerial competences.
Two consequences flow from the above arguments.
First, the underlying reason for the creation of institu-
tional PPPs was the need to find a politically viable solu-
tion to the introduction of cost-cutting health care
policies (and the consequences deriving from their
implementation, e.g., the dismissal of small local general
hospitals), rather than the result of rational planning to
enhance forms of public-service provisions. Second,
institutional PPPs were not conceived as alternatives,
but rather as complement to the traditional public-ser-
vice provisions for a defined set of services and goals.
Indeed, two empirical considerations support these
arguments. First, each JPFE budget is part of the general
LHA budget. The public authority thus monitors JPFE
expenditure and ultimately guarantees any financial risks
taken over by the company. Second, JPFE’s missions
were designed to lessen the pressure on the LHA bud-
gets through the development of profitable market seg-
ments that would increase the demand for both SSN
inbound patient mobility and private out-of-pocket
patients.
All cases achieved the real (hidden) institutional aim,
namely the dismissal of a small hospital without major
complaints from the local public.
Governance Structure
All JPFEs were set up as stock companies, suggesting
the will of public partners to operate in a more flexible
legal framework than that of the traditional public-sec-
tor regulation. In all cases, private partners are entrepre-
neurs with different degrees of specialisation and
organisational development in distinct branches of
healthcare. What is intriguing is the extent to which
JPFEs were granted autonomy by the constituent part-
ners. Indeed, public parties held two contradictory
expectations, namely the development of a dynamic and
entrepreneurial initiative and the need to maintain the
direct control over the service delivery. Concurrently,
private partners wanted to retain responsibility for the
entrepreneurial and managerial functions despite their
minority shareholding.
In this potentially conflicting scenario, the degree of
capitalisation of the JPFEs played a pivotal role in deter-
mining the effective degree of autonomy of the PPPs.
Only in Case A were the assets transferred to the new
society by the public party as a form of capitalisation,
while the private partner contributed significant finan-
cial resources to balance the level of investment and,
consequently, of shares. In doing so, the organisation
was granted autonomy to develop infrastructural activ-
ities, one of the major drivers of strategic change in the
health care sector. Both infrastructural transformation
and services’ portfolio reorganisation plans were enabled
by the high degree of capitalisation. The relevant finan-
cial exposition of both investors constituted a strong
incentive for the JPFE management, which was asked to
guarantee an adequate rate of return on the invest-
ments. However, the return on investment for the pri-
vate partner was squeezed by the public shareholding,
even though the latter originated exclusively from the
allocation of physical resources. This structure made the
financial constraints brought in by the private investor
more difficult.
In contrast, in the remaining cases, LHAs owned the
facilities and rented them to the PPPs, thus partially
undermining JPFEs’ strategic autonomy and weakening
management commitment to results. Furthermore, this
strategy brought the public partner back in the organisa-
tional internal decision process due to mandatory
approval needed to perform any investment activity.
Generally speaking, a chief reason for the lack of allo-
cation of public capital resources (e.g., buildings and
facilities) to the PPP is that the amount of capital trans-
ferred depends upon the value of the single assets,
which may not reflect the amount needed for the agreed
division of shares. While private partners may achieve
balance in equity shares only by increasing the financial
contribution, this action can lead to an overcapitalisa-
tion of the company compared with the estimated turn-
over in service activities. However, despite these
limitations, results have shown that whenever physical
assets were transferred to the newly established com-
pany, they acted as a strong organisational incentive to
achieve PPPs’ strategic goals by partially increasing man-
agerial autonomy.
Bureaucratic and Administrative Procedures
Public tender procedures have been adopted in all cases
for the selection of the private party. The stringent cri-
teria set for the evaluation of offers, however, limited
the number of firms participating in the selection pro-
cess, and often led to the submission of a single offer.
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The lack of private-sector initiative unveiled the diffi-
culty in finding private entrepreneurs willing to coop-
erate with PAs in service-delivery functions (and not
only in financial or building activities). This issue is
common to many institutional PPPs throughout Europe
and is generally due to both market factors (lack of pri-
vate-sector entrepreneurs focusing on core health ser-
vices) and procedure limitations (difficulty in
establishing a negotiation based on trust).
From an administrative point of view, despite the
common legal framework of the stock company, two
JPFEs continued to use public procurement procedures
in the fulfilment of ordinary purchasing activities, while
the other two adopted private procedures. The driver
behind this latter choice can be traced back to the inter-
nal organisational culture and, specifically, to the degree
of autonomy given to the managers appointed by the
private partner. Only in Case A has a proper public-pri-
vate integrated purchasing approach been developed,
through the adoption of a voluntary code regulating pri-
vate buying procedures and guaranteeing transparency
and publicity in the procurement process. This arrange-
ment constitutes a good example of the virtuous coexis-
tence of the two cultures.
A final issue concerns the relationship with the work-
force, with specific regard to the contractual relations.
Civil servants operating in the previous facilities and
continuing their work in the new company kept the
public-sector contracts even though they would have
been required by law to shift to the private discipline.
The co-existence of personnel with different contractual
profiles for the same job positions, although justified by
the novelty of the experience and the need to maintain
political consensus, may lead in the long term to treat-
ment inequalities and internal resistance from part of
the workforce. This findings shows the “provisional”
nature given to the JPFE and the difficulty in formalizing
the collaboration through a stabilised institutional form.
Relationship with the Purchasing Authority
In all cases, the public partner (i.e., LHA) was both the
owner of the company (51% shareholding) and the pur-
chasing authority (almost 100% of revenues in all cases).
This indeed reflects two possible ways in which the pub-
lic sector can exert control over the PPP, namely
through ownership or purchasing powers. Acting as the
purchaser is potentially easier when the hospital has a
clear and focused mission and provides a limited set of
services, as in the case of the JPFEs, where initial service
agreements were signed, specifying service targets and
revenues. Conversely, whenever the mission is broad
and largely indefinite, as in the case of general hospitals,
it is rather difficult to develop the purchasing function.
However, in all cases analyzed, the public authority
preferred to act through the property function, steering
and latently influencing the decision-making processes
at the PPP board level rather than through the more
politically visible inter-institutional purchaser function.
Final Reflections on the Initial Performance
Case A has registered an annual 18% increase in the
number of discharges in the 2004-2008 period thanks to
the implementation of a strong network with the cardi-
ology and cardio-surgery acute departments within the
area. The high levels of achieved specialisation achieved
led to an increase in the mix of patients coming outside
the sphere of competence of the Local Health Authority
(currently 50% of the users). The significant expansion
of activities and revenues was agreed by the board,
where the public partner acted as shareholder, without
previously modifying the service contract agreed to.
Thus, the LHA purchasing function was not properly
activated, because the adjustments on the service agree-
ment were rather made as an ex post bureaucratic duty.
Conversely, Case B has only partially achieved the activ-
ity targets, and failed the pre-established targets of infra-
structural renovation. Financial indicators show a
precarious economic situation, with substantial losses in
the 2007-2008 biennium (-471,000 €). Despite the
intense debate raised at the board level, no action was
taken by the purchasing authority, which did not adjust
the contract goals and revenues for the subsequent
years.
In a similar way, the remaining two JPFEs report a
breakeven over the whole period. However, they failed
to develop the new expected service areas. The LHAs in
their purchaser role were not able to exert pressure on
the organisation, being rather satisfied as shareholders
to break even. The weakness of the purchasing function
may also explain the lack of infrastructural investments
undertaken by the public partners owning the facilities,
being a signal of an unclear target planning.
Conclusions
The overarching aim of the paper was to investigate the
reasons for the adoption of institutional PPPs and the
governance and managerial features that could make
them effective. The evidence collected from the four
cases revealed that public administrations did not follow
a rational decision process in the type of provision form
deemed most efficient for a given set of services. Rather,
PPPs were chosen as contingent solutions to implement
health policy reforms without losing local political con-
sensus. Stated differently, PPP were conceived as a way
of renovating public facilities through the involvement
of private providers without losing public sector control.
Specifically, the choice of this organizational form was
adopted to enable the conversion of hospitals for general
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care, whose missions and goals are broad and hardly
definable, into specialised care facilities. In all four cases,
the (hidden) policy goal of partially dismissing a local
hospital while maintaining stakeholder consensus was
achieved.
All PPPs were established with clear and focused goals
so that the relationship between the public-sector
authority and the company could be regulated by service
agreements specifying the activity targets, the correspon-
dent fees and revenues, and, consequently, the return on
the investment. This arrangement could have made the
purchasing function a potential key steering tool. How-
ever, in all cases, the ownership function was the first to
be activated, and public partners preferred to act as
company owners rather than service commissioners,
even if targets were measurable and defined. The former
was exerted in the board rooms and was therefore less
politically visible, while the latter was rather public and
transparent.
In general terms, those PPPs that obtained a positive
evaluation by the regional committee shared four gov-
ernance and managerial features: (i) a strategic market
orientation to a specialised service area with a sufficient
potential demand, (ii) the allocation of public capital
assets and the consistent financial involvement of the
private partner, (iii) the adoption of private administra-
tive procedures in a regulated setting while guaranteeing
the respect of public administration principles, and (iv)
a clear regulation of the workforce to align the contracts
with the organizational culture. In contrast, the lack of
significant capital involvement and, consequently, of
partners’ commitment, combined with the maintenance
of public administrative procedures and the presence of
unclear contractual arrangements may explain the unsa-
tisfying results of some of the experiences.
To conclude, the institutionalization of the collabora-
tion between public and private actors by the establish-
ment of a new independent company highlights two
major tradeoffs deriving from bringing different public
and private agendas into an organised setting. The first
is private for-profit seeking versus public breakeven
maintenance. Our research suggests that this trade-off
might be overcome by considering returns in terms of
intangible profits such as image and economies of
experience deriving from the privileged position the
private partner holds within the SSN. The second is
public local budget containment versus private portfo-
lio and scale increase. Recent trends for JPFEs suggest
that this conflict can be resolved by rethinking about
public shareholding, namely by diversifying the mix of
public partners including multiple local authorities so
that the PPP can increase the level and amount of
commissioning.
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